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Abstract
This Comment argues that, contrary to the Amerada Hess ruling, the FSIA is the sole means
of obtaining jurisdiction over a foreign soverign. Part I discusses the Amerada Hess decision. Part
II examines the FSIA and the ATS and how they have been judicially interpreted. Finally, Part III
concludes the Amerada Hess decision is incorrect and suggests and alternate interpretation of the
FSIA and the ATS.

COMMENT
FOREIGN SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY AFTER AMERADA
HESS SHIPPING CORP. v. ARGENTINE REPUBLIC:
DID IT GO DOWN WITH THE HERCULES?
INTRODUCTION
United States federal courts have generally held that they
may obtain jurisdiction over a foreign sovereign only if the
claim falls within one of the enumerated exceptions to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976' ("FSIA").' The
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, however, has recently held in Amerada Hess Shipping Corp. v. Argentine
Republic3 that a U.S. federal court has jurisdiction, pursuant to
the Alien Tort Statute4 ("ATS"), over a claim brought by two
alien corporations against the government of Argentina for a
violation of international law. The court concluded that this
claim was not barred by the FSIA, even though it did not fall
within an FSIA exception.
This Comment argues that, contrary to the Amerada Hess
ruling, the FSIA is the sole means of obtaining jurisdiction
over a foreign sovereign. Part I discusses the Amerada Hess decision. Part II examines the FSIA and the ATS and how they
have been judicially interpreted. Finally, Part III concludes
that the Amerada Hess decision is incorrect and suggests an alternate interpretation of the FSIA and the ATS.
1. Pub. L. No. 94-583, 90 Stat. 2891 (codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1332, 1391,
1441(d), 1602-11 (1982)).
2. See, e.g., Verlinden B.V.v. Central Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480 (1983) (claim
must fall within an FSIA exception for jurisdiction to exist in case involving breach of
contract claim brought against Nigeria); Frolova v. Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, 761 F.2d 370 (7th Cir. 1985) (FSIA barred wife's claim for damages from Soviet
Union's refusal to allow her husband, a Soviet citizen, to emigrate); O'Connell Mach.
Co. v. M.V. Americana, 734 F.2d 115 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1086 (1984) (no
jurisdiction in tort action against an instrumentality of Italy for damages to a gencrator shipped on the defendant's vessel absent an FSIA exception).
3. 830 F.2d 421 (2d Cir. 1987), cert. granted, 56 U.S.L.W. 3712 (U.S. Apr. 18,
1988) (No. 87-1372).
4. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1982). The ATS was originally enacted as part of theJudiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 9, 1 Stat. 73, 77. In 1948 it was incorporated, with very
little change, into 28 U.S.C. § 1350. See Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 646, § 1350, 62
Stat. 869, 934.
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I.

AMERADA HESS SHIPPING CORP. v.
ARGENTINE REPUBLIC

During the afternoon of June 8, 1982, Argentine military
aircraft bombed the Hercules, a Liberian oil tanker, while the
tanker was in the South Atlantic Ocean, well within international waters. 5 Argentina was then in the midst of an armed
dispute with the United Kingdom over the sovereignty of the
Falkland Islands." No warning was given to the Hercules, a neutral ship, before the bombings.7
At the time of the attack the Hercules was owned by United
Carriers, Inc. ("United"), and was under a long-term charter
to Amerada Hess Shipping Corp. ("Amerada"). 8 Pursuant to
this agreement, Amerada used the Hercules to transport oil
from Alaska to its refinery in the United States Virgin Islands.!)
Both Argentina and the United Kingdom had been notified
regularly by the United States Maritime Administration of the
presence of U.S. and Liberian flagships in the South Atlantic.'°
Accordingly, five days before the attack, Argentina received
notice of the Hercules.'
5. Amerada Hess, 830 F.2d at 423. The Hercules was approximately 600 nautical
miles off the coast of Argentina and 500 nautical miles off the coast of the Falkland
Islands when she was attacked. Id. This location was well outside of the declared war
zones. Appellants'Joint Brief at 5-6, Amerada Hess Shipping Corp. v. Argentine Republic, 830 F.2d 421 (2d Cir. 1987) (No. 86-7602, 86-7603), cert. granted, 56 U.S.L.W.
3712 (U.S. Apr. 18, 1988) (No. 87-1372) [hereinafter Appellants'Joint Brief].
6. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp. v. Argentine Republic, 638 F. Supp. 73
(S.D.N.Y. 1986), rev'd, 830 F.2d 421 (2d Cir. 1987), cert. granted, 56 U.S.L.W. 3712
(U.S. Apr. 18, 1988) (No. 87-1372). During this conflict, the United Kingdom requisitioned over 60 privately owned ships to mobilize its military forces. P. CAL.vER'r,
TUE FALKLANDS CRISIS 84-85 (1982). These ships brought troops and supplies from
every direction to the South Atlantic. Id. at 84-88. One of the largest ships requisitioned was the QE2, a luxury cruise liner that transported an entire infantry brigade.
Id. at 85.
7. Amerada Hess, 830 F.2d at 423. After the final bombing, the Hercules received
two warnings to change course or suffer attack; the first came 55 minutes after the
third bombing; the second, one hour and 35 minutes after the third bombing. Appellants' Joint Brief, supra note 5, at 6.
8. Anierada Hess, 830 F.2d at 423.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id. Argentina had had prior dealings with the Hercules. Amerfda Hess Shipping Corp. v. Argentine Republic, 638 F. Supp. 73, 73-74 (S.I).N.Y. 1986), rrvd. 830
F.2d 421 (2d Cir. 1987), cert. granted, 56 U.S.L.W. 3712 (U.S. Apr. 18, 1988) (No. 871372). In fact, one month earlier, while on its way to St. Croix, the hercues had
departed from its planned course at the request of the Argentine Navy to assist in
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After the bombing, the severely damaged Hercules managed to reach port in Rio de Janeiro, where an undetonated
bomb was found in one of its fuel tanks.' , Because both the
risk of explosion and cost of repair were great, the Hercules was
scuttled in the South Atlantic."'
Shortly after the attack, Amerada and United obtained independent counsel in New York.' 4 On August 3, 1983, Amerada's attorneys submitted a report to the Argentine Embassy in
Washington, D.C., with a demand for compensation.' 5 Following five unsuccessful attempts over the next six months to
learn of Argentina's position, Amerada was told by the First
Secretary of the Embassy to pursue the claim directly with the
Ministries of Defense and Foreign Affairs in Buenos Aires."
Amerada then hired an Argentine attorney who conditioned his retention on the stipulation that he would not have
to litigate this claim in the Argentine courts. 1 7 His demands
for compensation from the Argentine government over the
next two months were not met.' 8 By May 1984, with only two
weeks left before its claim would be barred by Argentina's twoyear statute of limitations, Amerada had received no payment
from the Argentine government.' 9 Amerada then contacted
several other Argentine law firms, all of which refused to accept the case.2 0
On the last day to bring the claim in Argentina, Amerada's
U.S. attorneys contacted the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Buenos Aires and the Argentine Embassy in Washington and researching for survivors from the prior sinking of an Argentine cruiser. 638 F. Supp.
at 73-74.
12. Amerada Hess, 830 F.2d at 423.
13. Id.
14. Appellants'Joint Brief, supra note 5, at 8.
15. Id.at 9.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id.at 9-10.
19. Id.at 9-11.
20. Id. One firm cited Amerada'a unlikelihood of success in the Argentine
courts as its reason for refusing to take the case. Id.at 10. Another said it did not
wish to engage in litigation against the Argentine government with the Falklands War
still in progress. Id. at 10- 11. After initially accepting the case, a third firm reneged,
stating that after reviewing the records it believed that the Hercules was not a neutral
ship, but one directed by the English fleet. Id.at 11.
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quested a one-year toll of the statute of limitations.2' 1 Amerada
never received a response.2 2 Having exhausted all possible
means of settlement in Argentina, 2' Amerada and United
brought suit in the United States District Court for24 the Southern District of New York seeking monetary relief.
It was not clear, however, whether the district court had
jurisdiction over the claims. Plaintiffs argued that the sinking
of the Hercules was a violation of international law and, thus,
subject matter jurisdiction existed under the ATS. 2 5 The ATS
grants jurisdiction to the federal courts in civil cases involving
violations of the law of nations or treaties of the United
States.26 Argentina moved to dismiss for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction under the FSIA. 2 7 The FSIA provides personal
and subject matter jurisdiction over foreign sovereigns, but
only for acts that fall into one of its enumerated exceptions,28
for instance, the expropriation of property by a foreign sovereign. 29 The Southern District of New York granted Argen21. Id. at 12.
22. Id. United's attorneys were kept informed of Amerada's progress. Id. On
March 27, 1985, United's attorneys met unsuccessfully with the Vice Chancellor of
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Culture. Id.
23. Id. at 12-13. Liberia ruled itself out as a forum for adjudication on the
ground that a Liberian judgment would be meaningless because of Argentina's lack
of assets in Liberia. Brief for the Republic of Liberia as Amicus Curiae at 9, Amerada
Hess Shipping Corp. v. Argentine Republic, 830 F.2d 421 (2d Cir. 1987) (No. 86granted, 56 U.S.L.W. 3712 (U.S. Apr. 18, 1988) (No. 87-1372).
7602, 86-7603), cert.
24. Amerada Hess, 830 F.2d at 423. United Carriers sought US$10,000,000 for
the loss of the Hercules and Amerada sought approximately US$2,000,000 for the fuel
lost when the Hercules was scuttled. Id.
25. Amerada Hess, 638 F. Supp. at 74. Amerada also argued in the district court
that jurisdiction existed under the doctrine of universal jurisdiction. Id. at 74. This
doctrine states that jurisdiction exists when a defendant is found guilty of criminal
conduct that is prohibited by every nation. George, Defining Filartiga: Characterizing
International Torture Claims in United'States Courts, 3 DICK. J. INT'L L. 1, 30-31 (1984).
The district court rejected this contention because universal jurisdiction can support
jurisdiction only in criminal cases. Amerada Hess, 638 F. Supp. at 77.
26. See Amerada Hess, 638 F. Supp. at 75-76.

27. Amerada Hess, 638 F. Supp. at 73.
28. See infra notes 80-86 and accompanying text. FSIA's exceptions include: actions in which the foreign sovereign has waived its immunity, 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(1)
(1982); the case is based upon commercial activity in the United States, id.
§ 1605(a)(2) (1982); property is taken in violation of international law and that property is located in the United States, id. § 1605(a)(3) (1982); the case involves rights in
property in the United States aquired by succession or gift, id. § 1605(a)(4) (1982):
and the case is based on a non-commercial tort committed in (he United States, id.
§ 1605(a)(5) (1982).
29. See 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(3).
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tine's motion to dismiss,"' holding that the FSIA provides the
exclusive means of obtaining jurisdiction over a foreign sovereign. ' Therefore, if an act does not fall into one of the FSIA's
enumerated exceptions, the sovereign is immune. The court
then analyzed the relationship between the FSIA and the ATS
and concluded that the FSIA did not pre-empt the ATS; it simply narrowed the class of possible defendants under the ATS
to non-sovereigns.
Amerada and United then appealed to the Second Circuit. 4 Reversing the district court ruling, the Second Circuit
held that jurisdiction existed under the ATS. 5 The court
agreed with the district court that the FSIA is the sole means
by which a foreign sovereign can obtain immunity in U.S.
courts. 36 However, it disagreed with the lower court's finding
that the FSIA is the exclusive means of obtaining jurisdiction
over a foreign sovereign.3 7 The court held that in addition to
the FSIA's enumerated exceptions, there is jurisdiction in U.S.
courts over foreign sovereigns under the ATS for claims involving torts committed in violation of international law:"
The Second Circuit first determined that, taking Amerada's and United's complaints as true, 39 Argentina's acts violated well-established principles of international law. 4" The
court, looking to its prior decision in Filartigav. Pefia-Irala4 to
ascertain what constituted a violation of international law, reasoned that Argentina's conduct violated the law of nations and
international treaties regarding rights of neutral ships on the
30. Amnerada Hess, 638 F. Supp. at 77.
31. See id. at 74-77.
32. See id. at 75.
33. See id. at 76.
34. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp. v. Argentine Republic, 830 F.2d 421 (2d Cir.
1987), cert. granted, 56 U.S.L.W. 3712 (U.S. Apr. 18, 1988) (No. 87-1372).
35. Id. at 422-23.
36. Id. at 428.
37. Id. at 428-29.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 423. Federal courts may dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction
by relying on "any of three separate bases: (1) the complaint alone; (2) the complaint
supplemented by undisputed facts evidenced in the record; or (3) the complaint supplemented by undisputed facts plus the court's resolution of' disputed facts." Williamson v. Tucker, 645 F.2d 404, 413 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 897 (1981).
40. Amerada Hess, 830 F.2d at 423.
41. 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980).
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high seas. 4 2 The court equated Argentina's act with piracy, 4 3
an act long recognized as a violation of international law. 4 4
Moreover, the circuit court rejected Argentina's argument
that the drafters of the ATS intended to preserve the status
quo, that is, absolute immunity of foreign sovereigns, when the
ATS was enacted in 1789."5 Regardless of whether immunity
existed then, the court continued, the ATS should be interpreted as it exists today.4 6 The court adhered to the "modern
view ' 4 7 that sovereigns are not immune from claims for violations of international law. 4 8
As to the FSIA, the court found that Congress did not
consider violations of international law to be within the FSIA's
scope when it enacted the statute.4 9 Citing legislative history,
the court held that the three goals of the FSIA were: to codify
the restrictive theory of sovereign immunity; to give the judiciary the exclusive power to decide questions of sovereign immunity; and to set forth uniform procedures for bringing
42. See Amerada Hess, 830 F.2d at 423-24. The court cites several treaties, including the Pan American Maritime Neutrality Convention, signed Feb. 20, .1928, 47 Stat.
1989, T.S. No. 845, 135 L.N.T.S. 187, and the International Convention Concerning
the Rights and Duties of Neutral Powers in Naval War, signed Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat.
2415, T.S. No. 545, 1 Bevans 723, in support of its finding that Argentina's conduct
violated international law. Id. at 424.
43. Id. ("Where the attacker has refused to compensate the neutral, such action
is analogous to piracy ....
).
44. See United States v. Smith, 18 U.S. 71, 75, 5 Wheat. 153, 161 (1820) ("So
that, whether we advert to writers on the common law, or the maritime law, or the
law of nations, we shall find, that they universally treat of piracy as an offence against
the law of nations, and that its true definition by that law is robbery upon the sea.").
However, a necessary element of piracy is the taking on the high seas for one's personal gain. Convention on the High Seas, Apr. 29. 1958, art. 15, 13 U.S.T. 2312,
2317, T.I.A.S. No. 5200, at 6, 450 U.N.T.S. 82, 90.
45. See .4merada Hess, 830 F.2d at 424-25. Argentina argued that had Congress
intended to change the established practice of foreign sovereign immunity, it would
have done so expressly. Id. at 425.
46. Id. (citing Filartiga v. Pefia-Irala. 630 F.2d 876, 881 (2d Cir. 1980)).
47. Id. The "modern view" has its roots in The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677
(1900), where the Supreme Court held that international law can be ascertained by
looking to "the customs and usages of civilized nations: and, as evidence of these, to
the works ofjurists and commentators." 175 U.S. at 700. The most famous modernday case dealing with violations of international law has subscribed to this view. See
Filartiga v,. Pefia-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 880-81 (2d Cir. 1980).
48. .Imerada Hess, 830 F.2d at 424-25.
49. Id. at 426-27.

666 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LA WJOURNAL [Vol. 11:660
claims against foreign sovereigns.50 Stressing its view that the
FSIA was intended for commercial purposes, 5 ' the court
deemed that the FSIA did not pre-empt the jurisdictional grant
of the ATS for violations of international law by foreign sovereigns.5 2
After concluding that subject matter jurisdiction existed
under the ATS, the court next determined that Argentina had
sufficient national contacts with the United States to be subject
to the personal jurisdiction of U.S. courts.5 3 The court found
the following contacts persuasive: Argentina was aware of U.S.
interest in the Hercules by virtue of the notice given by the
United States Maritime Administration; 54 the Hercules was involved in U.S. domestic trade;5 5 the Hercules' contract required
payment in the U.S.; 56 Argentina had benefited from the freedom of the high seas; 5 1 and Argentina would not be burdened
by defending a suit in the United States. 58 However, it seems
clear that the court was sympathetic to the plaintiffs' jurisdictional arguments because of fairness considerations based on
Amerada's claim that it could not obtain a hearing in Argen59
tina.
In contrast, the dissent in the Second Circuit pointed to
what it found to be clear Congressional intent to prohibit U.S.
jurisdiction under circumstances such as these. Relying on the
50. Id. (citing H.R. REP. No. 1487, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 7, reprinted in 1976 U.S.
CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 6604, 6605-06).
51. Id. at 427. The court stated that Congress, concerned with the increase in
commercial transactions between U.S. citizens and foreign sovereigns, enacted FSIA
primarily to provide U.S. citizens with a forum for adjudication of contractual disputes stemming from these transactions. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 428.
54. Id. at 423.
55. Id. at 428.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. See id. ("Considerations of fairness also weigh in favor of exercising jurisdiction since appellants have sought redress of their grievances in Argentina and were
unable to obtain even a hearing."). Further evidence of the court's sympathy for the
plaintifl can he seen in its conclusion. After setting forth a landmark argument, the
court retreated, calling its opinion a "narrow one." Id. at 428-29. It referred to the
great burden on the plaimil to prove a violation of international law under ATS. Id.
at 429. Finally, the court concluded that FSIA was not totally inapl)licable in this case
because the procedural requirements of FSIA would still have to be considered. Id.
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legislative history of the FSIA, the dissent argued that the FSIA
was intended to pre-empt any state or federal law that granted
immunity to foreign sovereigns, 6° thereby leaving the FSIA as
the sole standard for resolving questions of foreign sovereign
immunity. 6 ' In the dissent's view, jurisdiction exists only when
a claim falls within an FSIA exception. 62 The dissent deemed
it significant that Congress had in fact considered violations of
international law when it enacted the FSIA, as demonstrated
by the FSIA's expropriation exception.6 3 This exception de-

nies immunity for claims involving "rights in property taken in
violation of international law." 64 Thus, the dissent concluded
that because Argentina's acts did not fall within one of the
FSIA's exceptions, there was no jurisdictional basis for Amerada's and United's claims in U.S. federal courts.6 5
II.

THE ALIEN TORT STATUTE AND THE FOREIGN
SOVEREIGN IMMUNITIES ACT
A.

The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act

Although it was generally believed at the time the ATS
was enacted that foreign sovereigns enjoyed absolute immunity, 6 6 until the middle of the twentieth century there was no

67
set policy in the United States of foreign sovereign immunity.
60. Id. at 429-30 (KearseJ., dissenting) (citing H.R. REP. No. 1487, 94th Cong.,
2d Sess. 12, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 6604, 6610).
61. Id. at 430 (Kearse, J., dissenting).
62. Id.
63. Id. at 430-31.
64. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(3). The expropriation exception grants jurisdiction for
claims brought against foreign sovereigns involving rights in property taken in violation of international law when the property, or property exchanged for it, is present
in the United States. Id.
65. .- nerada Hess, 830 F.2d at 431 (Kearse, J., dissenting).
66. "For more than a century and a half, the United States generally granted
foreign sovereigns complete immunity from suit in the courts of this country.- Verlinden B.V. v. Central Bank of Nigeria. 461 U.S. 480, 486 (1982). Judicial recognition of the doctrine of foreign sovereign immunity can be traced back to The
Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon, II U.S. 74, 7 Cranch 116 (1812). In that case
immunity was granted from a claim that sought to attach a vessel in a U.S. port that
was allegedly taken on the high seas under the orders of Napoleon, Emperor of
France. Id. The Supreme Court expressed its intent to bring the United States in
line with other nations with respect to recognition of absolute intmunitv for sovereigns in foreign courts. Id. at 90-91, 7 Cranch at 143-45.
67. See H.R. REi'. No. 1487, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 8 [hereinafter HousE REPORT].
reprinted in 1976 U.S. COD CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 6604, 6606-07; yo Mehren. The
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When a claim was brought in a U.S. court against a foreign
sovereign, and the sovereign wished to be granted immunity,
the sovereign would ask the State Department to intervene in
its favor."8 Such requests put the State Department in the awkward position of having to grant or deny the foreign sovereign's wishes."" The State Department sought to follow the
practice of other nations by applying a restrictive approach in
granting requests for immunity; 70 that is, it granted immunity
for the sovereign's public acts, 7' but no immunity for its private or commercial acts. 72 The Department sometimes departed from this approach, however, because of diplomatic
pressures brought by foreign sovereigns. 73
Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, 17 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 33, 36-37 (1978).
The "erosion" of the doctrine of absolute immunity for foreign sovereigns in U.S.
courts began at the end of the nineteenth century and continued into the twentieth
century until it was replaced with the doctrine of restrictive immunity. von, Mehren,
supra, at 36-37.
68. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 67, at 7, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS at 6605-06; see, e.g., Mexico v. Hoffman, 324 U.S. 30, 31-33 (1945)
(State Department communicated, without endorsing, Mexican government's request
for immunity from claim for damages caused by vessel owned, but not possessed, by
Mexican government); Ex parte Republic of Peru, 318 U.S. 578, 581 (1943) (State
Department responded to Peru's request to intervene in judicial proceedings then
pending in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana). Courts gave
great deference to the immunity determinations of the State Department. Note, The
Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976: Giving the PlaintiffHis Day in Court, 46 FORDHAM
L. REV. 543, 547 (1977).
69. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 67, at 8, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS at 6606-07; Note, The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 and Jnrisdictioni Under the ComiiercialActivities Exception: Vencedora Oceanica Navegacion, S.A. v.
Compagnie Nationale Algrienne de Navigation, 4 B.U. INT'L LJ. 125, 128 (1986).
70. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 67, at 8, repinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWs at 6606-07. Before FSIA was enacted, "all of the important trading
and industrial countries of the Western world, with the sole exception of the United
Kingdom, had adopted some form or other of the restrictive doctrine of foreign sovereign immunity." von Mehren, snpra note 67, at 38. In 1977, the United Kingdom
adopted the doctrine of restrictive immunity for actions brought in personam. See
Trendtex Trading Corp. v. Central Bank of Nigeria, 1119771 I Q.B. 529 (C.A.).
71. HoUsE REPORT, snpra note 67, at 8, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWs at 6607. Public acts of a sovereign have been defined as internal adinilstratlve acts, legislative acts, acts concerning the armed forces, acts concerning
diplomatic activitv and public loans. Victory Transp. Inc. v. Comisaria Gen., 336
I".2d 354, 360 (2d Cir. 1964), ert. denied, 381 U.S. 934 (1965).
72. HousE RE op1r, sinpra note 67, at 7, repriited in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AIMN. NEWs at 6605. Private acts of a state have been defined as those that are
commercial rather than political in nature. Id. at 8, reprinted in 1976 1.S. CODE CoN;.
& ADMIN. NEws at 6607.
73. Id. at 7, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CoDE CON;. & ADMIN. NEWS at 6606. As a
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In an attempt to formalize the procedure, the State Department officially adopted the restrictive theory of sovereign
immunity in the Tate Letter of 1952."M This attempt did not,
however, fully solve the problem because the State Department still had to decide, without the benefit of a legal determination by a U.S. court, whether a case involved a sovereign's
private or public acts.75
Congress responded to the problem in 1976 by enacting
the FSIA. 71' The purposes of the FSIA were clearly set forth in
its legislative history. First, the FSIA provides specific guidelines for determining when a .foreign sovereign is immune
result of diplomatic pressures, immunity determinations were largely inconsistent.
Note, The Supreme Court's Verlinden Decision: A Retreat to Activism, 16 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1081, 1099-1100 (1983). In addition to the lack of uniformity among the
State Department decisions, the courts had discretion to determine questions of immunity in cases in which the State Department refused to participate. Id.
74. House REPORT, supra note 67, at 8, reprinted in U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEws at 6607 (citing Letter from Jack B. Tate, Acting Legal Advisor of the Depart-

ment of State, to Philip B. Perlman, Acting Attorney General (May 19, 1952), reprinted
in 26 DEP'T ST. BULL. 984 (1952)).
75. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 67, at 8, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS at 6607; see also Note, supra note 68, at 549 (the State Department did
conduct "informal hearings" but these hearings were a far cry from judicial proceedings). The State Department's decisions were always subject to change because of
the political climate.
76. Pub. L. No. 94-583, 90 Stat. 2981 (codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1332,

1391, 1441(d), 1602-11 (1982). The pertinent provisions of FSIA are as follows:
§ 1604. Immunity of a foreign state from jurisdiction
Subject to existing international agreements to which the United States
is a party at the time of enactment of this Act a foreign state shall be immune
from the jurisdiction of the courts of the United States and of the States

except as provided in sections 1605 to 1607 of this chapter.
§ 1605. General exceptions to thejurisdictional immunity of a foreign state
(a) A foreign state shall not be immune from the jurisdiction of courts
of the United States or of the States in any case(I) in which the foreign state has waived its immunity either explicitly or by implication ...;

(2) in which the action is based upon a commercial activity carried
on in the United States by the foreign state; or upon an act performed
in the United States in connection with a commercial activity of the foreign state elsewhere; or upon an act outside of the territory of the
United States in connection with a commercial activity of the foreign
state elsewhere and that act causes a direct effect in the United States;
(3) in which rights in property taken in violation of international
law are in issue and that property or any property exchanged for such
property is present in the United States in connection with a commercial activity carried on in the United States by the foreign state ...
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from claims in U.S. federal courts,7 7 thereby implementing the
restrictive doctrine of foreign sovereign immunity. 7 Second,
it shifts to the judiciary the authority to decide when a foreign
sovereign is immune under the statute. 79 Third, in cases
where the sovereign is not immune, the FSIA provides specific
procedures for bringing claims and obtaining personal jurisdiction over a foreign state.8 0 Lastly, it sets forth the means to

execute a judgment against a foreign sovereign. 8
(4) in which rights in property in the United States acquired by succession or gift or rights in immovable property situated in the United
States are in issue; or
(5) not otherwise encompassed in paragraph (2) above, in which
money damages are sought against a foreign state for personal injury or
death, or damage to or loss of property, occurring in the United States
and caused by the tortious act or omission of that foreign state or of any
official or employee of that foreign state while acting within the scope of
his office or employment; except this paragraph shall not apply to(A) any claim based upon the exercise or performance or the
failure to exercise or perform a discretionary function regardless of
whether the discretion be abused, or
(B) any claim arising out of malicious prosecution, abuse of
process, libel, slander, misrepresentation, deceit, or interference
with contract rights.
(b)A foreign state shall not be immune from the jurisdiction of the
courts of the United States in any case in which a suit in admiralty is brought
to enforce a maritime lien against a vessel or cargo of the foreign state,
which maritime lien is based upon a commercial activity of the foreign state
28 U.S.C. §§ 1604-1605 (1982).
77. House REPORT, supra note 67, at 7, reprinted iin1976 U.S. ConE CONG. &

at 6605. Foreign sovereigns are immune from claims in U.S. courts if
the claim does not fall
within an FSIA exception. See 28 U.S.C. § 1604-1607.
ADMIN. NEWS

78. HousE REPORT, supra note 67, at 7, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. &

ADMIN. NEws at 6605. Foreign sovereign immunity is to be granted only in actions
involving the sovereign's public acts (Yire imperii). Id. Immunity should not be
granted in actions involving a sovereign's private acts Y're gestio)iis).
71-72 and accompanying text.
79. HousE REPORT, supra note 67, at 7, reprinted in 1976 U.S.
ADMIN. NEWS at 6605-06. Unlike the State Department, courts
whether immunity exists without pressures from foreign sovereigns.

See supra notes
CODE CONG. &
can determine
Id. This would

ensure uniformity in immunity determinations. Id.
80. Id. at 8, reprinted iii 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws at 6606. All of
FSIA's exceptions require some form of minimum contacts with the United States.
Id. at 13, repriited in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 6612. FSIA also sets
forth procedures for service of process on a foreign state. Id. at 23-26, reprtiled in
1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws at 6622-25; see28 U.S.C. § 1608 (1982).
81. HousE REi'POR, supra note 67, at 8, reprinted ii 1976 U.S. ConE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS at 6606: see 28 U.S.C. §§ 1609-1611 (1982). For Further discussion of'
FSIA's procedural requirements, see Kane, Suiiig Foreign Sovereigis: .-1 Procedural Con-
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Congressional intent that the FSIA be the exclusive means
of obtaining jurisdiction over foreign sovereigns is also evident
from the legislative history8 2 and has been so interpreted by
the Supreme Court in Verlinden B. V v. Central Bank of Nigeria.s3

In Verlinden, a unanimous Supreme Court reversed a Second
Circuit ruling that had denied jurisdiction over a claim brought
under the FSIA by an alien plaintiff against an alien defendant.84 The Supreme Court held that the FSIA is applicable in
all cases involving foreign sovereigns and only where an exception to the FSIA exists will subject matter jurisdiction be
found.15 Therefore, unless one of the FSIA's exceptions applies, a court has no power to hear the case.8 6
Moreover, the FSIA specifically states that it applies only
to foreign sovereigns8 7 and their agencies and instrumentali89
ties.8" Nowhere does it state that it applies to state actors.
This limitation is consistent with the restrictive theory of impass, 34 STAN. L. REV. 385 (1982); Note, Sovereign Immunity, 18 HARV. INT'L L.J. 429
(1977).
82. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 67, at 12, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS at 6610. The legislative history states that the FSIA
sets forth the sole and exclusive standards to be used in resolving questions
of sovereign immunity raised by foreign states before Federal and State
courts in the United States. It is intended to preempt any other State or
Federal law (excluding applicable international agreements) for according
immunity to foreign sovereigns, their political subdivisions, their agencies,
and their instrumentalities.
Id.
83. 461 U.S. 480, 496-97 (1982) (claim brought by Dutch corporation for breach
of contract against instrumentality of Nigerian government). "[If a court determines
that none of the exceptions to sovereign immunity applies, the plaintiff will be barred
from raising his claim in any court in the United States .... Id. at 497.
84. Id. at 497-98, rev'g 647 F.2d 320 (2d Cir. 1981). The Second Circuit ruled
that actions brought under FSIA by foreign plaintiffs exceeded the jurisdictional
grant of article III of the Constitution. 461 U.S. at 485; see 647 F.2d at 325.
85. 461 U.S. at 493. The Court found that the jurisdictional grant of FSIA
would support a claim brought by an alien. Id. at 489-91. The Second Circuit had
ruled that the "arising under" clause of article III of the Constitution is too narrow to
support jurisdiction over a foreign defendant when the plaintiff is also an alien. Id. at
485; see 647 F.2d at 325. In reversing, the Supreme Court held that the "arising
under" clause of article III is sufficiently broad to support subject matter jurisdiction
in actions brought by foreign plaintiffs under FSIA. 461 U.S. at 489-91.
86. Id. at 493-94.
87. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1602-1603 (1982).
88. Section 1603 provides:
(b)An "agency or instrumentality of a foreign state" means anv' entity(1)which is a separate legal person, corporate or otherwise and
(2) which is an organ of a foreign state or political subdivision
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munity, which would not grant public officials immunity from
personal liability for "acts carried out in their official capacity."90
B.

The Alien Tort Statute

The Alien Tort Statute, which is derived from the First Judiciary Act of 1789,"' provides:
The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any
civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States.'
The ATS has no legislative history.9 3 It has been referred
to as "a kind of legal Lohengrin, ' ' 94 and courts have struggled
over its meaning and application.9 5 In an action brought pursuant to the ATS, the plaintiff must show that there has been a
violation of the law of nations or of a treaty of the United
States. 96 Although treaty violations clearly trigger jurisdiction
under the ATS, only7 one claim for a treaty violation has thus
9
far been successful.
thereof, or a majority of whose shares or other ownership interest is
owned by a foreign state or political subdivision thereof, and
(3) which is neither a citizen of a State of the United States as defined in section 1332(c) and (d) of this title, nor created under the laws
of any third country.
28 U.S.C. § 1603 (1982).
89. See id.
90. J. SWEENEY, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF FOREIGN IMMUNITY 53 (1962) (pub-

lic officials and agents of a state are entitled to immunity for acts performed in their
official capacity when a claim is brought against a state).
91. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 9, 1 Stat. 73, 77.
92. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1982).
93. Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 812 (D.C. Cir. 1984)
(Bork,J., concurring), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1003 (1985). The Senate debates over the
Judiciary Act were not recorded and the House debates do not directly or indirectly
mention ATS. Id.; seealso D'Amato, The Alieni Tort Statute and the Foundinbg of the Con stitution, 82 AM. J. INT'L L. 62 (1988) (ATS was enacted for national security purposes);
Randall, Federalfiurisdition Over InternationalLaw Claims: Inquiries into the .lie Tort Statute, 18 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 1 (1985) (although there is no legislative history on
ATS, the author suggests that the drafters of ATS were responding to several tortious acts that had been committed in the United States on foreign ambassadors).
94. IIT v. Vencap, Ltd., 519 F.2d 1001, 1015 (2d Cir. 1975) (although the ATS
"has been with us since the first Judiciary Act ... no one seems to know whence it
came").

95. Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 775.
96. 28 U.S.C. § 1350.
97. See Bolchos v.Darrell, 3 F. Cas. 74 (D.S.C. 1795) (No. 1,607) (14th article of
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Judges disagree over what constitutes a violation of the
law of nations that would be actionable under the ATS. Judge
Kaufman, writing for a Second Circuit panel in Filartigav. PeffaIrala," argued that the law of nations is ever-changing and
must be interpreted that way--"courts must interpret international law not as it was in 1789, but as it has evolved and exists
among the nations of the world today." 99 This view was followed by Judge Edwards of the District of Columbia Circuit in
his concurring opinion in Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic.'I '

By

contrast, in his separate concurring opinion in Tel-Oren, Judge
Bork argued that the only violations actionable under the ATS
are those recognized when the ATS was enacted in 1789."° '
Since its enactment in 1789, there have been approximately forty reported cases brought pursuant to the ATS,' ° "
the treaty between the United States and France required that slaves recaptured by
their owner be returned to party who seized them). Courts have generally held that
treaties do not provide individuals or party nations with rights unless the treaty so
provides. Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 808 (BorkJ., concurring) (citing Foster v. Nielson,
27 U.S. 195, 239, 2 Pet. 253, 314 (1829), overruled on other grounds, United States v.
Percheman, 32 U.S. 38, 7 Pet. 51 (1833); Canadian Transp. Co. v. United States, 663
F.2d 1081, 1092 (D.C. Cir. 1980); Dreyfus v. Von Finck, 534 F.2d 24, 29-30 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 429 U.S. 835 (1976)). This is the doctrine of non-self executing treaties.
See id. (Bork,J., concurring). When the treaty does provide a right to sue, the remedy
is limited to that specified in the treaty. Seth v. British Overseas Airways Corp., 329
F.2d 302, 306-07 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 858 (1964) (plaintiff's recovery for
lost luggage was limited to amount provided by Warsaw Convention); Upper Lakes
Shipping Ltd. v. International Longshoremen's Ass'n, 33 F.R.D. 348 (S.D.N.Y. 1963)
(federal courts cannot maintain action when litigants are parties to treaty expressly
providing disputes are to be settled and remedies granted by International Joint
Commission).
98. 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980).
99. Id. at 881 (citing Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. 158, 3 Dall. 199 (1796)).

denied,
100. 726 F.2d 774, 777 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Edwards, J., concurring), cert.
470 U.S. 1003 (1985).

Each judge in Tel-Oren wrote his own opinion concurring in

the result. See 726 F.2d at 775-98 (Edwards,J.); id. at 798-823 (Bork,J.); id. at 823-27

(Robb, J.).
101. Id. at 812-13 (Bork, J., concurring). Judge Bork, looking to Blackstone,
cites three international law violations recognized in 1789: violations of safe conducts, infringement of the rights of ambassadors, and piracy. Id. at 813 (citing 4 W.
BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 68, 72, quoted in I W.W. CROSSKEY, POI.ITICS AND CONSTITUTION IN THE HISTOTY OF THE UNITED STATES 459 (1953)). UnderJudge Bork's

view, current international law does not give private parties a cause of action under
the ATS. Id. at 810-16.
102. See, e.g., In reKorean Air Lines Disaster of September 1, 1983, Misc. No. 83-

0345 (D.D.C. Aug. 2, 1985); Siderman v. Argentina, No. CV 82-1772-RMT (MCx)
(C.D. Cal. Mar. 7, 1985) (order vacating default judgment and dismissing action): see
also Randall, sipra note 93, at 4-5 nn. 15-17 (listing reported cases brought under the
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only four of which involved foreign sovereigns as defendants.' O3 In each of these four cases, the claimant had the burden of proving that jurisdiction existed over the foreign sovereign under the FSIA before the court would consider its claims
under the ATS. 1°4 As a result, only one case brought under
the ATS, Von Dardel v. Union of Soviet Socialist Republics,"°5 has
been able to survive this threshold inquiry."16
Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic,' °7 a District of Columbia
Circuit decision and the first of these four cases, involved an
attack by the Palestine Liberation Organization on a civilian
bus in Israel.1 0 8 All three judges, in separate concurring opinATS). Only four cases brought for violations of the law of nations or treaties of the
United States have been successful. See Von Dardel v. Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, 623 F. Supp. 246 (D.D.C. 1985) (violation of diplomatic immunity found
actionable under ATS in claim for damages and injunctive relief on behalf of Swedish
diplomat Raoul Wallenberg); Filartiga v. Pefia-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980) (sister and father of Paraguayan tortured to death by police officer in Paraguay, in violation of that country's laws, recovered damages under ATS); Adra v. Clift, 195 F.
Supp. 857 (D. Md. 1961) (mother's concealing daughter's true identity and taking
her from country to country to avoid being located by child's father, who was entitled
to custody of child under Lebanese law, held violation of law of nations and actionable under the ATS); Bolchos v. Darrel, 3 F. Cas. 810 (D.S.C. 1795) (No. 1607) (treaty
between United States and France required that slaves recaptured by their owner be
returned to party who seized them).
103. Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774 (D.C. Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1003 (1985) (discussed infra notes 108-11 and accompanying text);
Von Dardel v. Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, 623 F. Supp. 246 (D.D.C. 1985)
(discussed infra notes 119-31 and accompanying text); In re Korean Air Lines Disaster
of September 1, 1983, Misc. No. 83-0345 (D.D.C. Aug. 2, 1985) (discussed infra notes
112-14); Siderman v. Argentina, No. CV 82-1772-RMT (MCx) (C.D. Cal. Mar. 7,
1985).
104. See infra notes 107-19 and accompanying text.
105. 623 F. Supp. 246 (D.D.C. 1985).
106. See id. at 250-56. The Von Dardel case has been criticized as misinterpreting
the FSIA. See Amerada Hess Shipping Corp. v. Argentine Republic, 638 F. Supp. 73,
77 (S.D.N.Y, 1986) (arguing [Ion Dardel was incorrectly decided), rez"d, 830 F.2d 421
(2d Cir. 1987), petition for cert. filed, 56 U.S.L.W. 3592 (U.S. Feb. 16, 1988) (No. 871372); Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 4-5, Amerada Hess Shipping
Corp. v. Argentine Republic, 830 F.2d 421 (2d Cir. 1987) (Nos. 86-7602, 86-7603),
cert. granted, 1988 U.S. LEXIS 1697 (Apr. 18, 1988) (No. 87-1372) [hereinafter Brief
for the United States] (United States asked court to re-examine its default judgment
against the Soviet Union under FSIA).
107. 726 F.2d 774 (D.C. Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1003 (1985).
108. 726 F.2d at 775. The Libyan Arab Republic's co-defendants in this suit
were the Palestine Liberation Organization, the Palestine Information Office, the National Association of Arab Americans, and the Palestine Congress of North America.
Id.
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9
ions, agreed that jurisdiction did not exist in U.S. courts, °'
and two judges specifically held that the claim against Libya
was barred because it did not fall within one of the FSIA exceptions.'

'0

Similarly, in In re Korean Air Lines Disaster,"' a case

involving the wrongful-death claims against the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics for the bombing of a Korean Air Lines
commercial airliner,'2 the U.S. District Court for the District
of Columbia held that there can be no jurisdiction
under the
13
ATS when there is none under the FSIA.'
Siderman v. Republic of Argentina," 4 the third case in which

an action was brought against a foreign sovereign pursuant to
the ATS, involved a claim against the government of Argentina
for the government-sponsored torture of an Argentine citizen.' ' The District Court for the Central District of California
held that Congress did not intend to affect the immunity of
foreign sovereigns when it enacted the ATS, as indicated by
Congressional silence on the subject at a time when "the legal
status quo was the recognition of immunity." ' " 6 Therefore,
the court concluded that the ATS did not provide an independent means of obtaining jurisdiction over a foreign sovereign." 17
Thus, the only case prior to Amerada Hess in which a federal court exercised jurisdiction over a foreign sovereign pursuant to the ATS was Von Dardel."l 8 This case involved a claim
brought for damages and injunctive relief for the arrest, deten109. Id. at 775.
110. Id. at 775-76 n.1 (Edwards,J., concurring); id. at 805 n.13 (Bork,J., concur-

ring). Judge Robb held that jurisdiction was barred by the political question doctrine. Id. at 823.
11i.Misc. No. 83-0345 (D.D.C. Aug. 2, 1985).
112. Id. at 1.
113. Id. at 11. "Moreover, to hold that the Alien Tort Claims Act gives a cause
of action and subject matter jurisdiction where the FSIA forbids it would make a
nullity of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act." Id.
114. No. CV 82-1772-RMT (MCx) (C.D. Cal. Mar. 7, 1985) (order vacating default judgment and dismissing action).
115. No. CV 82-1772-RMT (MCx) (C.D. Cal. Sept. 28, 1984) (LEXIS, Genfed
library, Dist file) (entering default judgment against Argentina), vacated, No. CV 821772-RMT (MCx) (C.D. Cal. Mar. 7,1985).
116. No. CV 82-1772-RMT (MCx), slip op. at 3 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 7, 1985).
117. See id. at 2-3. The court then analyzed the plaintiffs' claims under the FSIA
and determined that they did not fall within a FSIA exception and, therefore, the
court lacked jurisdiction over the claims. Id. at 3-4.
118. 623 F. Supp. 246, 256-59 (D.D.C. 1985).
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tion, and possible death of Raoul Wallenberg, a Swedish diplomat.' '9 In Von Dardel, the District Court for the District of Columbia examined whether jurisdiction existed under the ATS,
but did so only after finding that there was jurisdiction under
0
the FSIA. 12
The court addressed a number of factors prompting a determination of jurisdiction pursuant to FSIA. First, the Soviet
Union, by defaulting, had failed to raise the affirmative defense
of sovereign immunity.' 2' Second, the district court reasoned,
Congress intended to incorporate recognized standards of international law, namely universal jurisdiction 22 and protection
of diplomats 123 into the FSIA. Next, relying on the " 'subject
to' international agreements" language of the FSIA,I2 4 the district court held that Congress intended existing international
agreements to remain intact.' 25 Thus, the district court continued, if any conflict arose between an existing international
agreement and the FSIA, the international agreement would
prevail. 26 The court found that the Soviet Union violated the
Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations' 27 and the 1973
119. Id. at 248. Wallenberg, a Swedish diplomat, was arrested in Hungary during World War II while working to save Jews from deportation to Nazi extermination
camps. Id. His work was funded by the United States. id. at 248-49. The Soviet
Union's claims that Wallenberg died in 1947 have been questioned by fellow prisoners who claim to have seen him alive as recently as 1981. Id. at 249-50.
120. See id. at 250-56.
121. Id. at 252-53; see 28 U.S.C. § 1604 (1982). 'The FSIA's legislative history
expressly states that sovereign immunity is an affirmative defense that must be specif
ically pleaded. See HOUSE REPORT, supra note 67, at 17, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 6616. Yet, the Supreme Court in Verlinden BV. v. Central

Bank of Nigeria held that if a foreign state fails to appear in court, the court must
make a determination whether an exception to FSIA applies or immunity should be
granted. 461 U.S. 480, 493-94 n.20 (1983).
122. Von Dardel, 623 F. Supp. at 253-54. However, universal jurisdiction does
not exist in civil cases. George, supra note 25, at 30-31.
123. Von Dardel, 623 F. Supp. at 253-54. The legislative history of the FSIA expressly states that sovereign immunity and diplomatic immunity are distinct concepts
and the FSIA was not intended to address diplomatic immunity. HousE REI'ORT,
supra note 67, at 12, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 6610.
124. 28 U.S.C. § 1604 (1982).
125. See Von Dardel, 623 F. Supp. at 254-55. The " 'subject to international
agreements' " language was intended to ensure that specific procedures established
in existing international agreements would remain in force. HOUSE REPORT, snpra
note 67, at 10, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 6608.
126. Von Dardel, 623 F. Supp. at 254-55.
127. Apr. 18, 1961, 23 U.S.T. 3227, T.I.A.S. No. 7502, 500 U.N.T.S. 95.
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Convention on Internationally Protected Persons,'12
and
therefore, jurisdiction existed under the FSIA. 2 1) Finally, the
district court held that the Soviet Union waived its immunity by
subscribing to treaties that recognize human rights.3 0° Once
jurisdiction was found under the FSIA, the court then determined that jurisdiction also existed under the ATS because the
Soviet Union's treatment
of Wallenberg constituted a violation
3
of international law. 1 1
128. Dec. 28, 1973, 28 U.S.T. 1975, T.I.A.S. No. 8532, 1035 U.N.T.S 167.
129. Von Dardel, 623 F. Supp at 254-55. Neither of these treaties has provisions
that mandate enforcement in U.S. courts. The Vienna Convention on Diplomatic
Relations, Apr. 18, 1961, 23 U.S.T. 3227, T.I.A.S. No. 7502, 500 U.N.T.S. 95, sets
forth certain diplomatic rights that member nations agree to recognize. It does not
have any provisions for its enforcement. See id.The Prevention and Punishment of
Crimes Against Internationally Protected Persons, Including Diplomatic Agents, Dec.
28, 1973, art. 3, 28 U.S.T. 1975, 1979, T.I.A.S. No. 8532, at 5, 1035 U.N.T.S. 167,
169-70, sets forth when and how a state should prosecute those accused of performing criminal acts against diplomats. Article 13 sets out procedures for the resolution
of disputes, none of which include adjudication in U.S. courts. 28 U.S.T. at 1983-84,
T.I.A.S. No. 8532, at 9-10, 1035 U.N.T.S. at 171-72. Although the Soviet Union is a
party to the treaty, it expressly reserved upon signing that it would not be bound by
article 13. MULTILATERAL TREATIES DEPOSITED WITH THE SECRETARY GENERAL, STATUS AS AT 31 DECEMBER 1985, at 84 [hereinafter MULTILATERAL TREATIES].
130. [ion Dardel, 623 F. Supp. at 255-56. The legislative history of the FSIA provides that foreign states may explicitly waive immunity by subscribing to a treaty that
expressly waives such rights. See HousE REPORT, supra note 67, at 18, reprinted in 1976
U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 6617. Implicit waiver may be made in any of the
following three ways: (1)by agreeing to arbitration in another country, (2) by agreeing that a contract be bound by the laws of another country, or (3) by filing a responsive pleading in an action before raising the defense of foreign sovereign immunity.
Id. But merely subscribing to a treaty that recognizes certain rights does not constitute a waiver. Frolova v. Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, 761 F.2d 370, 376-78
(7th Cir. 1985).
131. Von Dardel, 623 F. Supp. at 256-59. The district court applied the three
tests set forth in the concurring opinions in Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726
F. Supp. 774 (D.C. Cir. 1984), and concluded that jurisdiction over the Soviet Union
existed under each test. Under Judge Edwards's view, the arrest and detention for
over 35 years of a diplomat clearly violated a "principle of international law on which
the community of nations has reached a consensus." 'on Dordel, 623 F. Supp. at 257.
Infringement of the rights of ambassadors was recognized as a violation of international law in 1789, and thus, the court concluded under judge Bork's test. that the
Soviet Union's treatment of Wallenberg was actionable under the ATS. Id. at 258.
Also, the district court reasoned that Judge Robb would uphold jurisdiction because
the rights of diplomats are so well recognized that a lawsuit in U.S. courts would no
embarrass the United States. Id. at 258-59. What the district court failed to acknowledge is that both Judges Edwards and Bork held that jurisdiction over foreign sovereigns can be obtained only through FSIA. See supra note 110 and accompanying text.
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III.

HARMONIZING THE ALIEN TORT STATUTE AND
THE FOREIGN SOVEREIGN IMMUNITIES ACT

The Second Circuit found compelling reasons why Argentina's bombing of the Hercules violated the modern view of the
law of nations, and should therefore be subject to scrutiny
under the ATS. t' 2 Certainly the bombing of a neutral ship in
international waters is a heinous act that would be condemned
by most nations."' The argument, however, is less compelling
with respect to finding a treaty violation under the ATS because Argentina is not bound by any treaty with the United
States that recognizes the rights of neutral ships on the high
34
seas. 1

Regardless of how deplorable Argentina's acts were in
bombing the Hercules, neither the Southern District of New
York nor any other U.S. court is the proper forum for adjudication of this dispute. The sweeping language in the legislative
history of the FSIA, 13 5 coupled with that of the Supreme Court
in Verlinden,' 36 unequivocally demonstrate that the FSIA provides the sole means of obtaining jurisdiction over a foreign
sovereign in U.S. federal courts. Thus, because Argentina's
bombing of the Hercules does not fall within an FSIA exception, 3 7 there is no jurisdiction in U.S. courts for Amerada's
and United's claims. The view that the FSIA pre-empts the
132. See Amerada Hess Shipping Corp. v. Argentine Republic, 830 F.2d 421,
423-24 (2d Cir. 1987), cert. granted, 56 U.S.L.W. 3712 (U.S. Apr. 18, 1988) (No. 871372).
133. See 830 F.2d at 423-24. Amerada Hess lists several treaties that recognize the
rights of neutral ships on the high seas. Id.
134. Id. The Second Circuit noted that both the United States and Argentina
are signatories to The Geneva Convention of the High Seas of 1958, 13 U.S.T. 2312,
T.I.A.S. No. 5200, 450 U.N.T.S. 82. Amerada Hess, 830 F.2d at 423-24. Although
Argentina did sign The Geneva Convention of the High Seas, it never ratified it.
MULTILATERAL TREATIES, su$pra note 119, at 684.
135. See supra note 82 and accompanying text.
136. 461 U.S. 480, 493-94 (1982); see supra notes 83-86 and accompanying text.
137. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp. v. Argentine Republic, 638 F. Supp. 73, 75
(S.D.N.Y. 1986), rev d, 830 F.2d 421 (2d Cir. 1987), cert. granted, 56 U.S.L.W. 3712
(U.S. Apr. 18, 1988) (No. 87-1372). The majority in the Second Circuit never addressed the question whether plaintiffs' claims in Amerada Hess fell within an FSIA
exception. Both the dissent in the Second Circuit and the district judge agreed that
the case did not fall within an FSIA exception. See 830 F.2d at 430 (Kearse, J., dissenting); 638 F. Supp. at 75. This determination is consistent with past judicial interpretations of FSIA. The exceptions contained in FSIA are clearly not applicable because the bombing of the Hercules was neither a commercial act, expropriation, nor a
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ATS when foreign sovereigns are defendants, in addition to
being consistent with that of the United States Supreme
Court, 138 was the controlling precedent when Amerada Hess was
4
decided, 'M and is supported by the Department of Justice,1 0
the Attorney General, 4 ' and the Department of State.' 4 2
Congressional intent to grant immunity in a case such as
Amerada Hess is indicated not only by its failure to enact an exception to the FSIA encompassing torts committed outside of
the United States in violation of international law, but also by
the legislative history of the FSIA. 143 The FSIA was intended
to codify the restrictive theory of foreign sovereign immunity,
which recognizes immunity from claims involving a sovereign's
right in property acquired by gift or immovable property situated in the United
States.
Under the FSIA, a foreign sovereign may waive immunity. 28 U.S.C.
§ 1605(a)(1) (1982). The waiver argument, however, was not available to the plaintiffs in Amerada Hess because Argentina: (1) had not subscribed to any treaties that
waived immunity; (2) did not agree to arbitration in another country; (3) did not
agree to be bound by the laws of another country; and (4) did not file a responsive
pleading in Amerada Hess. See supra note 130.
The bombing of the Hercules also does not fall within the non-commercial tort
exception to the FSIA, 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(5) (1982). Courts have consistently interpreted this section as requiring that the tort have occurred in the United States.
See Frolova v. Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, 761 F.2d 370, 379 (7th Cir. 1985)
(rejecting plaintiff's claim that Soviet Union's detention of her husband, a Soviet citizen, was a tort actionable under non-commercial tort exception of FSIA); McKeel v.
Islamic Republic of Iran, 722 F.2d 582, 588 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 880
(1984) (suit brought by former American hostages against the government of Iran
deemed barred by FSIA because American embassies located abroad are not considered United States territories for FSIA purposes).
138. See Verlinden B.V. v. Central Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480, 493-94 (1982);
see also supra notes 83-86 and accompanying text (discussing the Verlinden opinion).
139. See O'Connell Mach. Co. v. M.V. Americana, 734 F.2d 115, 116 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 496 U.S. 1086 (1984) ("The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act insulates
foreign states from the exercise of federal jurisdiction except under the conditions
specified in the act.").
140. See Brief for United States, supra note 106, at 2-4.
141. See id.
142. See id. After-the Second Circuit decision, the United States filed a brief in
the Second Circuit requesting a rehearing, reinforcing its view that the FSIA preempts the ATS when foreign sovereigns are defendants. See Brief for the United
States as Amicus Curine in Support of Appellee's Petition for Rehearing and Suggestion for Rehearing En Banc or, in the Alternative, Petition for Rehearing and Suggestion for Rehearing En Banc at 2-4, Amerada Hess Shipping Corp. v. Argentine Republic, 830 F.2d 421 (2d Cir. 1987) (Nos. 86-7602, 86-7603), cert.
granted, 56
U.S.L.W. 3712 (U.S. Apr. 18, 1988) (No. 87-1372) [hereinafter Brief for the United
States Suggesting Rehearing En Banc].
143. See supra notes 76-81 and accompanying text.
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public acts, but denies immunity from claims relating to their
private or commercial acts.' 4 4 An act of a government's military forces during wartime clearly falls within the category of
public acts and would be accorded immunity under the restrictive view. 145 Therefore, as Congress intended the FSIA to
adopt this restrictive doctrine, it seems clear that Congress intended to deny jurisdiction in a case such as Amerada Hess.
In support of its view that the FSIA does not pre-empt the
ATS, the Second Circuit asserted that the FSIA is a commercial
statute only and that Congress was not considering violations
of international law when it was enacted. 4 6 The Second Cir147
cuit thus ignored the expropriation exception of the FSIA.
Also, the Court gave scant consideration to the non-commercial tort exception of the FSIA, which denies immunity for
claims brought against foreign sovereigns for torts committed

in the United States. 148
In addition, it should be noted that the Second Circuit
could not point to one U.S. case involving violations of international law in which a sovereign's request for immunity was
denied. Rather, it relied on the the Nuremberg trials of Nazi
war criminals conducted by the International Military Tribunal. 149 However, U.S. federal courts are courts of limitedjuris144. See supra notes 70-72 and accompanying text.
145. In re Korean Airlines Disaster of September 1, 1983, Misc. No. 83-0345,
slip op. at 8 (D.D.C. Aug. 2, 1985) (military decisions are strictly governmental in
nature; the shooting down of a Korean commercial jet was a purely political act).
146. See Amerada Hess, 830 F.2d at 427.
147. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(3) (1982) (this exception denies immunity when rights
in property are taken in violation of international law); see supra text accompanying
notes 63-64.
148. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(5) (1982). The Second Circuit in Amerada Hess mentioned the non-commercial tort exception parenthetically. Anlerada Hess, 830 F.2d at
427. This exception has been the source of a significant amount of litigation and is
demonstrative of the FSIA's reach into non-commercial areas. See, e.g., Gerritsen v.
de laMadrid Hurtado, 819 F.2d 1511 (9th Cir. 1987) (assault, kidnapping, interrogation, and taking plaintiff's camera and leaflets constituted torts actionable tinder
FSIA's non-commercial tort exception); MacArthur Area Citizens Ass'n v. Republic
of Peru, 809 F.2d 918 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (Peru's use of building as chancery in neighborhood zoned for residential purposes constituted interference with private use and
enjoyment of land and actionable under FSIA's noncommercial tort exception):
Frolova v. Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, 761 F.2d 370 (7th Cir. 1985) (rejecting claim that denial of exit visa to Soviet citizen was tort actionable under 28
U.S.C. § 1605(a)(5)).
149. Anterada Hess, 830 F.2d at 426. International Military Tribunals are a
branch of the International Court of Justice and are set up by states to investigate
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diction' 0 and are neither bound by the decisions of international military tribunals, 5 ' nor free to exceed the jurisdictional
grant accorded to them by Congress and Article III of the Constitution. 152 The Second Circuit seems to have been swayed by
the unusual circumstances of Amerada Hess. Claimants' frustrated attempts at negotiating with the Argentine government,
coupled with the probability that they would have been unable
to bring their claim in an alternate forum, made them very
sympathetic plaintiffs. But sympathy for such plaintiffs cannot
override clear Congressional intent to prohibit jurisdiction in
these circumstances.
Policy considerations support the view that U.S. federal
courts have no jurisdiction over claims against foreign sovereigns for violations of international law. The Second Circuit's
decision in Amerada Hess undermined the purpose of the FSIA
by opening up the doors of U.S. federal courts to claims that
Congress never intended to address.' 53 This decision may
make U.S federal courts the proper forum for the adjudication
of disputes between aliens and foreign sovereigns whenever
the alien can make any colorable claim for a violation of international law. Thus, these courts are now in the undesirable
position of deciding and enforcing claims that are typically of a
sensitive political nature. It will also be interesting to see how
the district court, on remand, will enforce a judgment against
Argentina if Amerada and United are successful on the merits. 154

Amerada Hess also effectively repeals the expropriation ex-

ception of the FSIA because U.S. courts would no longer be
bound by the FSIA's restriction that the property taken in viosensitive issues. 1. BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 24 (3d ed.

1979).
150. Owen Equip. & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365, 371-72 (1977) (federal court's subject matter jurisdiction is limited by article III of' the Constitution's
"arising under" clause and acts of Congress).
151. U.N. CHARTER art. 59 ("The decision of the court has no binding Force
except between the parties and in respect of that particular case.").
152. Owen Equip., 437 U.S. at 371-72.
153. See Verlinden B.. v. Central Bank of Nigeria. 461 U.S. 480, 490 (1982)
(Congress, in enacting FSIA, set forth "substantive provisions requiring some form
of substantial contact with the United States").
154. The ATS has no execution provisions. See 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1982). The
Second Circuit suggested that the district court Follow the execution provisions of
FSIA. ,.merada ttess,
830 F.2d at 429.
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lation of international law be located in the United States.
Under Amerada Hess, any claim for unlawful expropriation
brought by an alien could be enforced under the ATS, regardless of the location of the property, as long as the court has
personal jurisdiction over the foreign sovereign. Moreover,
the United States government itself has expressed concern for
the implications of the Amerada Hess decision on national and
foreign policy interests. 55 Specifically, the government fears
that foreign sovereigns will retaliate by stripping the United
States of its immunity, thereby exposing it to liability in foreign
courts for claims involving violations of international law. 156
The ATS, however, retains some vitality. It can still support a claim brought against a non-sovereign. Several plaintiffs
have been successful in prosecuting violations of human rights,
particularly claims involving torture by non-sovereigns. In the
landmark decision of Filartigav. Pefia-Irala,157 the Second Circuit held that jurisdiction existed under the ATS to hear a
claim brought against a former police officer of Paraguay for
the torture death of the plaintiffs' decedent. 58 The court determined that torture is a modern violation of international
law.151 More recently, in Forti v. Suarez,' 60 the Northern District of California upheld jurisdiction pursuant to the ATS over
a torture claim brought against a former Argentine general."'l
While the ATS's future role as the basis for bringing such
claims appears promising, it will be limited by courts' ability to
obtain personal jurisdiction over the defendant.'
155. Brief for the United States Suggesting Rehearing En Banc, supra note 142,
at 4. The United States did not condone Argentina's acts, but suggested that Amerada and United pursue their claim through diplomatic channels. Id.
156. Id. at 4-5.
157. 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980).
158. Id. at 878.
159. Id. at880-85.
160. No. 87-2058 1)I, slip op. (N.D.Cal. Oct. 6, 1987), discussed in Sherman,
Aliens Ia Sefor
e
Torts .Abroad, NAT'L. l..J., Nov. 2, 1987, at 17, col. 1.
161. Sherman, supra note 160, at 17, cols. 2-3.
162. The court was able to obtain personal jurisdiction over hoth of these alleged torturers because they were incarcerated in U.S. prisons on unrelated charges
when process was served. Filartiga v. Pefia-lrala, 630 F.2d 876, 879 (2d Cir 1980):
Forti v. Suarez, No. 87-2058 1)I.1, slip op. (N.D.Cal. Oct. 6. 1987), disoussed ii Sherman, supra note 160, at 17, col. 3. For further discussion on the use of the ATS in
prosecuting human rights violations, see Bazver, Litigaiiiig
I/ International Law ?f
lumanlRights:. .-1 How-To. -pproach, 7 WrrTER 1.. REv. 713 (1985): Note, Terrorisnim
(i a
IViolation q/lhe Law q/.VatioM, 6 FORDHAM INT'l L.J. 236, 251-52 (1982).
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CONCLUSION
The Second Circuit in Amerada Hess Shipping Corp. v. Argentine Republic has, in effect, introduced an additional exception
to the FSIA. In so doing, the Second Circuit has undermined
the purpose of the FSIA by providing a United States forum
for the settlement of international disputes. In light of the
Amerada Hess decision, it is time for legislative reform of the
ATS. Congress should formally limit the ATS to cases involving non-sovereign defendants, so that the ATS and the FSIA
can harmoniously coexist.
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